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Abstract 
 
 
This paper considers multiple control systems at the organizational level and argues for a nuanced and 
multifaceted approach for internal governance. For this undertaking, we look at a little-examined control and 
auditing instrument, the formalized audit procedures of Roman Catholic orders. These so-called visitations are 
one important pillar in the monastic governance system to counter aberrations. Utilizing surveys and interviews, 
we examine 106 Roman Catholic religious communities in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and connect these 
visitations procedures with rule violations and sexual abuse cases.  
 We argue that communities unaffected by scandals and rule violations rely strongly on process and clan 
control to address inefficiency and misconduct; whereas, affected communities focus more on business issues. 
We caution against the trend of relying predominantly on output-based processes while suggesting a balance 
between different types of control systems. Furthermore, we enhance the current discourse by considering 
implementation procedures of control. The religious orders attach great importance to the way control measures 
are carried out. To steer the behavior of their members, many successful orders even complement controls with 
personal support and identity strengthening. 
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1. Excesses and scandals in religious orders 
Governance has become a permanent issue in public dialogue. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, scandals 
of excessive manager compensation and fraudulent bookkeeping, and, most notably, misconduct relating to the 
financial crisis, have damaged the reputation of firms and triggered questions about the functioning of markets   
(Di Pietra et al. 2010; Bachman et al. 2011). Some authors speak of a crisis of governance (Magnan and 
Markarian 2011; Sun et al. 2011). The search for good governance is of immediate concern in order to regain 
control and restore confidence in the economic system and its leaders (Pirson and Turnbull 2011). 
 However, it is not only the economic world that laments scandals and crises. The Roman Catholic Church 
and some of its religious orders have experienced turbulent times. The revelation of child maltreatment, sexual 
abuse and authoritarian education methods in many Catholic organizations shocked the German public in the 
spring of 2010. The scandal made headline news for weeks. The immense attention resulted in a meticulous 
review of suspect organizations (for an overview, see Spiegel Online 2011, Die Zeit online 2010). Religious 
orders depend on their moral integrity. Therefore, the principals – the leadership of the religious orders and the 
Vatican – have a genuine interest in preventing such incidents. As such, the search for good governance is a 
central concern in religious organizations.1 
 An inevitable task in dealing with fraud and misconduct in organizations is that of controlling and 
monitoring members. An efficient functioning of organizations is designed by means of an appropriate 
configuration of the control systems. Concepts regarding (multiple) orientations of control have been known in 
the literature for a long time, but have gained too little attention in practitioner, organization and accounting 
literature (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Sitkin et al. 2010). In the last decade a growing number of scholars called 
for investigations into multiple control systems and their effects (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Caglio and 
Ditillo, 2008; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Grandori and Soda, 2006; Kennedy and Widener, 2008; Malmi and 
Brown, 2008; Sandelin, 2008). However, such research is still in its infancy.  
 Thus, in this paper we contribute to the research of multiple control systems by choosing the classic 
framework of Management Control Theory to investigate specific monastic audit procedures. The four control 
archetypes: process, clan, input and output control of Managerial Control Theory (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1977, 
1979; Thompson 1967; Turner and Makhija 2006) offer an appropriate theoretical underpinning for the analysis 
of monastic control systems that allows us to examine their effectiveness in relation to misconduct. Depending 
on the task environment and the goods produced, different combinations of output, process, clan, or input control 
are suggested to discipline members and reduce their misbehavior.  
 We chose to examine religious orders as a specific organizational form in the non-profit sector for our 
investigation of multiple control orientations. There are several reasons for this choice. First, in their long 
                                                 
1 We use a broad and classical definition of governance: it is understood as the set of processes, customs, 
policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way an organization is directed and controlled. The abuse cases 
represent a massive governance failure in the religious orders. 
 2
history, monastic organizations followed their own paths to control their sisters, padres and brothers. Similarly to 
other organizations, religious orders had to struggle with wastes of assets, laziness, political intrigues or sexual 
misconduct (see Helvetia Sacra 1986, a historical chronicle). Innovative organizational structures, for instance 
the religious orders were pioneers in the division of labor and the work ethic, and they brought considerable 
fortunes to many communities as far back as the early Middle Ages (Kieser, 1987). As a consequence, not only 
did the temptation toward misuse increase, but over the centuries an intriguing governance system emerged. 
Second, our focus is not on monastic governance systems as a whole (see Inauen et al. 2010a, 2010b), but on one 
specific audit instrument – the monastic visitation. The latter is interesting because it combines different forms of 
control in one procedure. Additionally, visitations developed differently within the various religious 
communities. Whereas some religious orders follow the trends in focusing on output control measures in their 
visitation procedures (and therefore concentrate on the economic situation of their community), many rely on 
process control and, in particular, on clan control to audit the communal and spiritual life of their brothers and 
sisters. Because of this diverging development, studying the little-known visitations may lead to new insights in 
relation to multiple control systems. Finally, the misuse scandals make the case of Catholic orders an important 
societal research topic. It could be enlightening for other organizations to look at those failures from a 
management control perspective.  
 To gain a better understanding of the visitations, we drew on qualitative and quantitative data. First, we 
reviewed the literature on visitations, searched constitutions of religious communities and interviewed monastic 
leaders. Second, we empirically investigated the characteristics of visitations in various religious orders. The 
analysis is based on a unique dataset that we collected between November 2009 and April 2010. More than 100 
representatives from 224 monastic communities completed our comprehensive survey on monastic governance 
just months before the scandals went public. This allowed us to analyze the relation between characteristics of 
the different visitation systems and the misconduct of the religious communities. For this purpose we combined 
the survey data with external information on the abuse cases. We used logistic regression analysis to determine 
what characteristics of the visitation systems are associated with higher probabilities of sexual abuse and internal 
misconduct.  
 The results are relevant in respect to multiple orientations of control and, in addition, throw a light on the 
scandals in the Catholic orders. One specific characteristic of monastic visitations is the distinct coexistence of 
different types of control in the monastic audits. Output measures are primarily applied to control economic 
activities; whereas, process and clan control are used to monitor spiritual and communal life. Interestingly and in 
line with the theory, the choice of emphasis depends on the practice of a community. For example, where 
contemplation dominates monastic life, clan control is more likely to play a dominant role. Our analysis 
indicates that visitation procedures can be an effective tool in preventing misbehavior. The outcomes on child 
abuse and on rule violations suggest that a focus on process and clan control has an impact on supervising 
principles and spiritual life. In contrast, a one-sided orientation on output control increases the probability of 
failures. We cannot explain why child abuse emerged in the monastic communities or where the failures 
originated. It does seem that visitations can be part of the solution though. If seriously applied and targeted, a 
positive preventive effect may be expected. However, we conclude that it is not sufficient to rely solely on 
appropriate types of control. For a successful auditing the type of implementation is equally important. Three 
issues stand out and are supposed to ensure the participation of the padres and brothers, hence enabling controls: 
trust in the visitors, confidentiality and the meaningfulness of the procedures. Additionally, the success of 
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control increases if the visitations go hand-in-hand with identity strengthening and personal support. In the best-
case scenario, monastic audits effectively combine process, clan and output controls with careful implementation 
and elements of identity strengthening.  
 By investigating monastic audits, our analysis advances a multiple-orientations approach to management 
control (Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Ferreira and Otley 2009; Malmi and Brown 2008). Most of the contributions 
refer to simple archetypes of control, whereas complex control structures are not fully explained (Caglio and 
Ditillo 2008). Using religious orders, we illuminate a multilayered audit instrument in a non-profit-sector 
organization and, therefore, deliver a rare empirical example in the field of multiple control systems. 
Organizations, regardless of size, need various governance and control structures to properly deal with the 
manifold challenges and contingency situations. We introduce the Managerial Control Theory framework of 
Ouchi (1977, 1979) as a basis to analyze multifaceted control systems and to bridge the gap between the fields of 
management control and organization theory. In the particular case of monasteries, we contribute to the 
development of the multiple control literature with two further aspects. First, the specific orientation of 
visitations, namely the focus on spiritual and community life, is fascinating. “Soft” factors, such as values, 
spirituality or social interaction are not typically associated with auditing procedures. Internal audits still 
concentrate primarily on finance, compliance and, more rarely, performance issues (Merchant and Van der Stede 
2012). However, in broadening traditional audit procedures, the monastic approach could be a step toward better 
governance. Second, we take a closer look at the accompanying factors of control. In practice and literature, little 
attention is paid to the successful implementation of control systems. A careful and comprehensible 
implementation of the procedures is necessary to promote a functioning control system and to avoid adverse 
effects (De Charms 1968; Deci and Ryan 1980; Frey 1992, Osterloh and Weibel 2008). In this respect, we look 
also at the connection between the visitation procedures and identity development, a rarely addressed issue in the 
discourse of control systems. On a more practical level, the paper offers a new perspective on the misuse 
scandals within the Catholic Church. 
 
2. Theoretical foundation 
The following subsections detail the theoretical basis of this study. First, we review the literature on control 
systems. Second, we present the characteristics of monastic visitations as an audit instrument in detail. 
 
2.1 Multiple orientations of control versus the one-fits-all approach 
Control systems are critical for the efficient functioning of an organization (Meyer and Gupta 1994; Meyer 
2003). Numerous definitions of management control exist, and many attempts have been made to determine its 
modes and mechanisms (for reviews, see Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Chenhall 2003; Malmi and Brown 2008; 
Merchant and Otley 2007). Two nearly unrelated research streams deal with the contents of multiple orientations 
of control. 
 Whereas the field of management control is dominant in the audit and accounting literature (Anthony and 
Govindarajan 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede 2011; Simons 1990; 1995), organization theory is also 
concerned with the mechanisms of control (e.g., Cardinal et al. 2010; Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1979, 1980). Both 
research paths build on similar theoretical underpinnings but also show several theoretical overlaps. Through the 
conscious use of control the responsible agents try to ensure that an organization’s members display expected 
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behaviors (Osterloh and Weibel 2006). The management control system is effective when it increases the 
probability that employees will behave in ways consistent with the organization’s objectives (Frost et al. 2012).  
 Concepts regarding multiple orientations of control have long been found in the literature (e.g., Otley 1980), 
but hardly gained deserved attention (Sitkin et al. 2010). Most of the contributions refer to simple archetypes of 
control, “whereas, more complex and varied combinations of control traits empirically observed are not fully 
explained” (Caglio and Ditillo 2008: p. 866). However, empirical research provides vast evidence that 
management control systems are large and complex sets of elements that are loosely connected and 
interdependent (e.g., Ambos and Schlegelmilch 2007; Carlsson-Wall et al. 2011; Frost et al. 2012; Gerdin 2005; 
Martinez and Jarillo 1989; O’Donnell 2000; St. John and Harrison 1999). Management control systems can be 
seen as packages which have to be dismantled for a better understanding of their impact (Chenhall 2003; Dent 
1990; Fisher 1998; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Malmi and Brown 2008; Otley 1980). For instance, the way control 
mechanisms relate to contingency variables depends on what other mechanisms are applied simultaneously 
(Chenhall 2003; Fisher 1998). Despite this realization, empirical and theoretical work on the topic is still rare 
(Abernethy and Chua 1996; Alvesson and Karreman 2004; Grant 2003; Rost and Osterloh 2009).  
 The organization literature refers to additional dimensions that should also be taken into account. Not only 
do the control systems as such play a role, but also social capital (Kirsch et al. 2010) or trust (Fryxell et al. 2002) 
have been established as important antecedents for the effectiveness of control systems. Furthermore, to ensure 
an efficient audit, appropriate implementation of the control processes has to be considered. How controls are 
perceived is crucial. In this context, the literature primarily refers to the crowding effect. The crowding effect 
suggests that external interventions and control may undermine intrinsic motivation. According to Motivation 
Crowding Theory (Deci et al. 1999; Frey and Jegen 2001), monitoring measures are most effective when they 
are not perceived as controlling. A vote of no confidence or a lack of appreciation can result in a crowding out of 
motivation, thus leading to reduced performance and more misbehavior. By contrast, if controls are seen as 
appropriate and useful, unintended effects are more likely to be absent and we can expect members to cooperate 
in the procedures – ensuring efficient control (Adler and Borys 1996). For example, procedural fairness and the 
consistency or impartiality of the controllers mitigate negative monitoring effects (Frey and Osterloh 2002; Tyler 
and Blader 2000). 
 Finally, an audit can include additional supportive tasks, such as developing identity. The literature has 
neglected this aspect so far. Individuals might be driven by strong identities, and their actions might be shaped 
by their commitment to this identity (Alvesson et al. 2008; George and Qian 2010, Weaver 2006). In other 
words, a positive influence on the behavior of the controlled persons is expected if the audits improve the 
perception of the living and working conditions of members. Accordingly, our focus on implementation and 
additional services complements the field of management control with other important aspects.  
 The multidimensionality of control systems stands in stark contrast to current developments in the 
governance discourse. Examining theory and practice leaves no doubt that one type of control currently 
dominates in controlling the behavior of managers and employees. Output control procedures constitute the 
foundation for performance assessments and incentive schemes, and have become increasingly popular during 
the last decades. There is even a proliferation beyond the corporate field extending to public administration (see 
the literature on “New Public Management”) as well as to the nonprofit sector (Dart 2004; Perry et al. 2009; Frey 
et al. 2013). The dominant paradigm behind these developments is the homo oeconomicus, which assumes fully 
rational and self-interested actors. Thus, external incentives are the best way to direct the members of an 
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organization efficiently (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Murphy 1990). While 
stricter regulation and rigorous standards are discussed on a governmental level, (Brenner and Schwalbach 2009; 
Kirkpatrick 2009; Snider 2009), companies focus on improved output control, for instance, adjusting 
remuneration systems to focus on the long run (Feinberg 2011; Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth 2010). However, 
history shows that the exclusive use of output measures may be ineffective in successfully addressing 
governance problems (Grant 2003; Rost and Osterloh 2009) and is likely to yield unintended effects (Keevers et 
al. 2011).  
 
2.2 Audits in the religious orders: visitations 
Very few contributions deal with the intersection between governance, control mechanisms and religious orders. 
In a seminal paper, Kieser (1987: p. 103) analyzes religious orders as the “first deliberately designed 
organization in the Occident.” They became wealthy through their rational organization of labor (e.g., the 
division of labor) and their work morale. This resulting wealth was an important reason why orders developed 
sophisticated control systems. McGrath (2007) investigated knowledge management in monastic communities of 
the medieval Irish Celtic church, which depended strongly on governance structures. Further, Inauen et al. 
(2010a; 2010b) and Rost et al. (2010) comprehensively studied the Benedictines’ governance structures, which 
are considered an essential factor in the longevity of these organizations. The aforementioned authors depict 
mainly the modes of action of the internal control mechanisms such as careful selection and socialization of 
novices or participation rights of the members. However, internal control is not sufficient if the subsidiaries’ 
members get together to circumvent regulations. Thus, the heads of religious orders and the church are interested 
in monitoring the local communities from the outside. One important pillar in the monastic governance system to 
counter such aberrations are the visitations (Müller 2003), which are carried out by the umbrella organizations of 
the religious orders. In examining the monastic visitation procedures, we place them in a context with multiple 
control systems and the recent child abuse scandals. In the following section the visitations are extensively 
described. 
 The term “visitation” harks back to the Latin word visitatio, which stands for an inspection or visit, but also 
can bear the meaning of affliction or punishment (Frieb 2006). The formalized visit in order to audit 
organizations is widely applied in Christian churches. We limit our analysis by concentrating on the visitations in 
religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church. The importance of the instrument is illustrated in Roman 
Catholic canon law, where visitations have become an institutionalized term and are described as an inherent 
requirement for all religious orders (Codex Iuris Canonici (CIC) 1983, par. 628). The visitation’s concrete 
implementation is regulated in detail in the internal law of the various religious orders and their communities. In 
the following, we introduce the purpose and procedures of this little-known concept.  
 A look into the literature and internal law, as well as interviews with monastic experts from different 
categories of orders,2 provides a better understanding of the monastic visitations. One purpose of the visitation is 
the immediate on-site inspection of the religious life in order to reveal and correct shortcomings (Hirnsperger 
2001; Müller 2003). On the one hand, the spiritual conditions and life of religious members are monitored; on 
the other hand, legal relationships, land tenure and the financial state – that is, the economic part of the religious 
organizations – are addressed. Betz et al. (2005) define the twofold orientation on spiritual and economic 
condition as being the core function of the visitation. However, as the constitutions disclose, the range of tasks is 
                                                 
2 See the Acknowledgements section for detailed information. 
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more comprehensive today. The constitutions of the Benedictine Congregation of Beuron (Beuroner 
Benediktinerkongregation 2003, par. 244) extensively describe the general targets a visitation usually has, not 
only in the Benedictine Order but in all religious orders we examined, as “The purpose of the monastic 
visitations is to make the delegate familiar with the situation in the particular monasteries, to strengthen abbot 
and convent in their enthusiasm for monastic life, to examine the adherence of general ecclesiastical regulations, 
Rule of the order, law of the congregation [the umbrella organization of the Benedictines] and traditions of the 
community, to intervene against observed misbehavior, to encourage the renewal of authorities deemed 
necessary and to monitor the economic situation of the monastery.” Depending on the community and order, the 
goals are weighted differently. 
 The visitations are accomplished by the umbrella organizations of a religious order, usually by the 
leadership of a province. The visitors normally have broad authority and are committed through a personally 
addressed obligation from the order’s leadership. Interview information and internal law reveal that the 
procedure of the visitations intended to achieve these objectives is more or less similar in every religious order. 
In some communities it is roughly outlined in the internal statutes (Franciscans 2007; Premonstratensians 1997). 
A monastic visitation is always announced, possibly with an antecedent questionnaire, which gives the members 
the opportunity to reflect and to prepare – and maybe to conceal. A church service opens the procedure, followed 
by extensive conversations between the visitors and the community’s leader, and then with every single member. 
The next step is the economic assessment of the organization. Religious organizations increasingly draw on 
external expertise (auditing services), but this does not discharge the visitors from liability (Meier 2006). The 
audit experts gather all the information to prepare the visitation report. The results and recommendations are first 
discussed with the leader and then presented to, and negotiated in, the plenum where changes are initiated. The 
visitation ends with a common service. Interestingly, the monitoring of the realization of the measures often 
devolves to the community’s number two, for instance, the prior. Some communities hold an assembly on the 
subjects of the visitation: A few months after the inspection, a delegation reviews the progress and 
implementation measures. 
 Despite the common fundamental structures of monastic auditing, visitations show varied characteristics 
that allow a comparison of the different visitation systems. Examples are the frequency of the inspection, the 
number of visiting persons, the visitor’s opportunities to influence and the subject of control. In more federalist 
orders such as the Benedictines, Cistercians or Premonstratensians, visitations are less frequent – ranging from 
every year to every six years – but come with more personnel, normally two or three visitors. The visitation’s 
duration depends on the community’s size and is more or less similar in the various orders. In a medium-size 
community of about a dozen members, the procedure lasts about three to seven days. However, enforcing the 
measures and subsequent improvement processes can take months or even years. The visitors have some 
discretion in the execution of the audits. More or less attention can be paid to the different items on the agenda. 
We find it striking that visitations in many religious orders are quite similar, but the elements, such as the objects 
of control, differ fundamentally. While we have communities where visitors are interested only in spiritual and 
community life (control the books may often be outsourced), others concentrate mainly on the business aspects 
or on problems such as recruiting and financing (often caused by the loss of members). In many communities, 
the visitors set thematic priorities. For instance, a rule from the constitutions or a Bible verse can be the leitmotif 
of the visit. Further, visitations are completed with additional tasks regarding specific traditions and the purposes 
of the particular orders. For example, for those members who do not live in the same monastery for a lifetime – 
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such as the Franciscans, who have to change their residence every nine years at a minimum – the information 
gained from the inspections provides the foundation for any moves. The report discusses how members can be 
appointed to the most suitable tasks in the best possible place. 
 In Managerial Control Theory, an adequate theoretical basis is found to meet the specific requirements of 
monastic governance. In the following sections, we derive hypotheses covering the types of control applied in 
the visitations. Different characteristics of the religious orders should affect the control system used. Then, we 
investigate the effectiveness of the control system in cases of sexual abuse and internal rule violations. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
In order to contribute to the discourse on multiple control systems, we investigate the monastic audit system. For 
the analysis, we rely on ideas originating in Managerial Control Theory. The theory highlights the link between 
control systems design and the organization’s task environment (Ouchi 1977, 1979; Turner and Makhija 2006; 
Cardinal 2001; Kirsch 1996). Task environment is defined on two dimensions. One is “knowledge of 
measurability and attributability of outputs;” the other is “knowledge of cause-effect relations” (Thompson 
1967), or worded differently, “knowledge of the transformation process” (Ouchi 1977).  
 Figure 1 illustrates the paper's theoretical foundation and the research questions. On the left-hand side, 
Ouchi’s four types of control (1977, 1979) are the starting positions for our analysis. Four mechanisms are 
delineated that control and steer the behavior of the managers and employees: input, output, process and clan 
controls. We investigate which types of control are applied in the monastic visitations and analyze their impact 
on misconduct, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of process and clan controls. In incorporating the 
implementation of visitations and additional services, we develop Managerial Control Theory in an important 
direction. We expect an indirect impact on misconduct if the procedures are fair and meaningful and if they 
simultaneously strengthen the identity of the religious members.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
                --------------------------------- 
 
3.1 Control forms 
Output control is most appropriate when process or cause-effect relations are difficult to specify, but the outputs 
are easy to measure (Eisenhardt 1985). In contrast, the preconditions of process control include evaluators that 
have the appropriate knowledge of the process of transforming inputs into outputs. Neither output control nor 
process control work sufficiently well when measurability and accountability of outputs is not given and the 
external controllers’ knowledge of the transformation process are limited. Clan or input control is proposed as a 
solution. Clan control can be described as an assessment of individuals or groups as to whether they follow 
internalized norms, procedures, professional standards and rituals (Grant 2011; Ouchi 1977). For instance, senior 
colleagues functioning as role models for younger coworkers and exhibiting the desired behavior induce the 
internalization of norms and values. A possible alternative to clan control in this quadrant (see Figure 1) is input 
control, which works in a different way. With careful selection, trustworthy people are chosen; and with 
socialization processes, the desired behavior of these members is further emphasized. The concept was extended 
by Sitkin et al. (2010) and Cardinal et al. (2004) who highlight shifts in the use of different types of control in a 
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longitudinal analysis. Similarly, in addition to organizational structure, Kirsch, Ko and Haney (2010) emphasize 
the importance of social capital as a precondition for an efficient clan control. Clan control is most effective if 
project managers and team members trust and respect one other, apply shared mental models and exchange 
information frequently.3  
 The visitation is a very stable and highly esteemed auditing system developed in the religious orders. 
According to Managerial Control Theory, the type of control depends on the ability to measure outputs and the 
knowledge of the transformation process. Taking this into account, we expect specific characteristics of control 
to gain acceptance in these communities over the centuries. Religious orders represent a paradigm for an 
organization in which the performance of the individual members is hard to quantify and is not easily assignable 
(here we see some parallels, for instance, to the knowledge-intensive work of managers) (Frost et al. 2010). 
Often, there is a lack of precise and quantifiable outcomes (Ehrmann et al. 2013). It is impossible to evaluate the 
effects of sincere prayer or to answer the question of how many of the padres, sisters and brothers go to heaven. 
Even the effects of social tasks such as helping people in need, youth work or missionary work are very hard to 
capture. This situation implies that the achievement and control of objectives is only possible, to a limited extent, 
with output criteria. To enable an appraisal, for example, of spiritual performance, we expect religious orders to 
draw on alternative types of control. Managerial Control Theory offers input, process and clan controls as a 
solution. It is imaginable that all three types of control are part of the visitation procedures. Are the right novices 
selected and are they carefully socialized into monastic life (input control)? Do the members adhere to traditions 
and rites; do prayers start punctually and in an attentive atmosphere (process control)? Does the community 
encourage the observance of rules and constitutions, and is misbehavior sanctioned by peers (clan control)?  
 In contrast, for the evaluation of the economic situation, a verification of output-performance is possible to 
some degree. As do other nonprofit organizations, religious orders have to be self-supporting. Earnings arise 
from work in the parishes, owner enterprises, lease of land, donations and many other undertakings. Here an 
output-performance comparison makes some sense, especially because the religious communities operate in 
manageable businesses, where this specific type of control is perfectly possible (Ouchi 1977, 1979). We expect 
output control where the management of the monastic properties is dominant, that is, where outcomes are easily 
measurable and assignable. Referring to Managerial Control Theory, we expect the religious communities to 
make use of the different kinds of control, that is, of multiple control systems.  
 However, we do not suggest that the religious communities weight the different types of control equally. 
The choice of control depends on the specific characteristics of the goods produced. Ehrmann et al. (2013: pp. 
31) define broadly two distinct sets of goods in religious orders: “search/experience goods, that is, goods whose 
features and characteristics are either easily evaluated before purchase or can be ascertained upon consumption, 
and credence goods, that is, goods whose utility impact is difficult or impossible to ascertain. The first set, for 
example, includes such products as beer, herbs, farming, mission, or solidarity with the poor. The quality of 
these products can be (more) easily evaluated and priced. The second set includes salvation goods like 
contemplation, or prayers.” One could expect that communities with a strongly contemplative orientation in 
which prayer, meditation or spiritual exercises are more important (and cannot be assessed by means of 
                                                 
3 Closely related to the framework of Ouchi et al. (1979) is the levers of control model from Simons (1990; 
1995; 2000). This equally comprehensive model shows many intersections and points of contact. For instance, 
diagnostic control shares many similarities with output control; whereas, belief systems build a bridge to clan 
control. 
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outcomes) than are purposes in economy, social affairs, education or mission, show a greater emphasis on 
process and clan controls. We formulate the first hypothesis: 
 
 H1. Communities that primarily focus on prayer and contemplation attach greater weight to process- and 
clan control in the visitations than do communities that pursue targets in “the outside world.” 
 
 Further, we suggest that specific traditions have an impact on the configuration of control procedures. With 
their specific history, spirituality or purpose, religious orders have different cultural practices and priorities.  
 
3.2 Effectiveness 
In addition to the arrangement of the control types, we examine whether and when visitations are effective. We 
examine their relation to sexual abuse cases and rule violations. According to the data available, an evaluation of 
monastic control systems’ effectiveness proves difficult. Due to privacy protection, it is impossible to view 
visitation protocols and to assess behavioral change, even if members are long deceased. However, the variance 
in the current visitation systems of the religious orders allows an evaluation of the different types of control. In 
particular, we are interested in the question of whether a focus on process and clan controls reveals a significant 
effect on the behavior of the padres and brothers, illustrating that a control of values and principles can be 
successful in audit procedures. Utilizing a quantitative, comparative approach between the communities, it is 
possible to investigate whether specific characteristics of the monastic audits are linked to the number of 
incidents. We investigate the impact of visitations on sexual abuse cases and rule violations.  
 
 H2a. Communities whose visitation procedures rely heavily on process- and clan control to examine the 
behavior of their members show a lower likelihood for sexual abuse cases. 
 
 H2b. Communities whose visitation procedures rely heavily on process- and clan control to examine the 
behavior of their members show a lower likelihood for violations of the basic rules than do communities 
whose visitation procedures rely heavily on output control. 
 
 Further, characteristics of visitations and religious orders suggest they have an impact on sexual misconduct 
and rule violation. On the visitations side, one would expect a correlation between the frequency of the audit 
procedures and misconduct in a religious community. Large differences exist. For instance, on average, 
Benedictines conduct visitations every 5.3 years, Franciscans 3.5 years, Capuchins 2.4 years, Dominicans 3.2 
years, Jesuits 1.2 years and Divine Word Missionaries 3.6 years. We analyze the following set of hypotheses: 
 
 H3a. The higher the frequency of visitations, the less likely are sexual abuse cases. 
 
 H3b. The higher the frequency of visitations, the less likely are violations of the basic rules. 
 
 In the theoretical section of this paper we emphasize the importance of an appropriate implementation of the 
procedures in order to prevent a crowding out of motivation. The data record does not allow for a quantitative 
analysis of these issues. We therefore rely on interviews and constitutions to decide which aspects the religious 
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leaders pay attention to when implementing their controls. Finally, an improvement of the controls is expected if 
they are combined with additional services that support identity and commitment to the organization. We 
investigate the impact of visitation procedures where identity development is fostered. From this we formulate 
the last set of hypotheses. 
 
 H4a. Communities whose visitation procedures attach importance to identity development show a lower 
probability for sexual abuse cases than do communities whose visitation procedures do not. 
  
 H4b. Communities whose visitation procedures attach importance to identity development show a lower 
probability for violations of the basic rules than do communities whose visitation procedures do not. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Procedure and sample 
The data for this analysis is based on a unique survey of Catholic religious orders in Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland that was carried out between November 2009 and April 2010. The survey was sent to 216 local 
communities; and 106 usable questionnaires were returned, of which 10 had to be excluded due to missing data 
on some of the variables. All major religious orders participated with a response rate of at least 40%. Table 1 
shows the breakdown of the orders in our sample.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 It was not possible to include the total population of the communities in the German-speaking area. We 
therefore use two main criteria for choosing orders and local religious communities: the category and the size of 
an order. The category depends on the historical background of the orders and comprises monastic orders, 
canons regular, mendicant orders, clerks regular and congregations (Schwaiger and Heim 2008). Although we 
inquired into the concrete, contemporaneous practices of the communities, these archetypes were important in 
choosing a balanced selection of religious orders. Our second criterion is the size of orders in the German-
speaking area. From every category, at least two of the largest orders – according to the number of houses of a 
religious order – are represented in the sample. Additionally, we targeted organizations in Germany (50 
communities), Austria (29), and Switzerland (27), due to the particular histories of and conditions within these 
countries. Seventy-three percent of the surveys were filled out by leaders, and nineteen percent by officials from 
local communities (executives in finance or education). Ninety percent of the responders possess a high level of 
education. Accordingly, we can assume that the participants possess a requisite knowledge of good governance. 
All respondents to our survey were male. 
  
4.2 Measures 
The following sections outline the variables used for the subsequent quantitative analysis. Tables 2a and 2b 
summarize the variable coding and display means and the standard deviations of dependent and independent 
variables. Correlations are listed in Appendix A. 
 Before crafting the questionnaire we conducted expert interviews to better understand what measures should 
be included in the survey and to increase content validity of the survey items. In order to gain in-depth 
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information on the visitations, we talked to seven monastic leaders (see Acknowledgements section for more 
information). These padres and brothers supervised the project and added to a correct understanding of the 
monastic structures and connections.  
 In addition to the subjective survey statements, objective sources are included in the regression analysis. 
Web and media research delivered current data on misconduct in the religious communities, as well as 
information concerning a religious community’s involvement in child and youth work. In order to get a 
comprehensive picture, we scrutinized the literature on visitations and thoroughly reviewed the constitutions of 
the different religious orders.  
 
4.2.1 Dependent variables  
To analyze the effectiveness of process- and clan control we rely on two dependent variables: sexual abuse cases 
and internal rule violations. In the first set of analyses we investigate the number of sexual abuse cases 
associated with each order. The sexual abuse cases were made public in 2010 in the German-speaking area and 
resulted in a meticulous review of suspect organizations. The monastic institutions were under general suspicion 
and were regarded with great skepticism. It seems unlikely that the religious organizations are able to conceal 
serious cases anymore. We reviewed media reports about sexual abuse cases. The reported cases reveal 
substantial scope in the number of victims and perpetrators. It must be assumed that many community members 
knew about the problems, but suppressed or concealed the truth. Such behavior stands in stark contrast to the 
religious orders’ constitutions and denotes a serious failure of a community. We excluded cases of isolated 
misconduct or crimes by a lone offender. Based on this information a binary dependent variable taking the value 
of 1 if an abuse case was reported and zero otherwise was created. 
 In the second set of analyses, we investigate internal rule violations of the orders. We asked the leaders of 
each order to tell us about acute problems in their communities (excluding financial and recruiting issues, which 
are common in many organizations) and to identify the most recent issue. Leaders reported about 20 cases that 
indicate a severe rule violation. Examples include the following: breaking vows, agitation, waste of assets and 
serious indiscretions. From this information we were able to create a variable that indicates internal rule 
violations. Considered jointly, the sexual abuse cases and the rule violations allow us to examine whether the 
characteristics of the visitations increase the probability for misconduct in the forms of sexual abuse and internal 
rule violations. Where the visitations focus on the control of principles and spiritual life, we expect fewer of 
these problems. Thus, we combined the information on abuse cases with the information on internal rule 
violations and created a dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if a rule violation or abuse case was reported 
and zero otherwise. 
  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.2.2 Independent variables  
The main independent variables are the type of control, frequency of visitations and supportive nature of 
visitations (that is, identity strengthening in the visitation procedures). These variables emerged as important 
based on the theoretical foundations presented in the literature review sections of this paper and as a result of the 
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preliminary interviews with monastic experts. Therefore, we included those variables in the survey. Additionally, 
we controlled for the type of order, national origin of the order, whether the order’s members are active in child 
and youth development, size of the order and age of the order’s members. The variables are explained in further 
detail below.  
 Type of control. A set of survey items aimed at identifying the different types of controls that illustrate the 
focus of the communities. We asked the monastic leaders: “Which importance do you ascribe to the visitations 
regarding the control of finances and economic activity, the control of rules and spiritual life?” The items depict 
different types of control; whereas the control of finances points to the monitoring of books and key figures – 
that is, typical output-control procedures, control of rules and spiritual life happen predominantly through 
process or clan controls (output control is not possible here). All items used 5-point Likert scales. Ultimately, we 
split the sample into two groups and create a dummy variable for process and clan controls. 
 Frequency of visitations. The frequency of visitations was measured as the number of visitations per year. 
Broad variance exists between the different religious orders as related to the audit frequency. The survey item 
asked monastic leaders how often (in years) their communities are visited.  
 Supportive nature of visitation. One item asked the monastic leaders to describe additional tasks of the 
visitations. Based on this qualitative information, we created a dummy variable reflecting which communities 
attach great importance to “identity strengthening” through the visitation procedures (Table 6). The variable 
takes the value of 1 if the visitation was considered as supporting the identity development of the order and zero 
otherwise. 
 Type of order. We used dummy variables to control for the archetypes of orders represented in our sample 
(clerks regular, canons regular, monastic orders, mendicant orders and congregations). Clerks regular is the 
reference category. 
 Youth development. This variable is a dummy variable that captures whether members of the order are 
active in child or youth development (1 if active in youth development and zero otherwise). Regarding the 
investigation of sexual abuse cases, an emphasis on youth development represents a crucial variable. The internet 
was helpful in searching for information about whether a community’s priorities include child and youth work in 
schools, parishes and youth centers. 
 Origin. We used a set of dummy variables to control for the national origin of the order represented in our 
sample. The sample comprises orders from Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Switzerland is the reference 
category. By controlling for countries, we account for differences in legislation and environments.  
 Size of order. We controlled for the size of the order by asking the respondent for the number of members 
that the order currently has.  
 Age. The age variable captures the average age in years of the respective community members. 
 Both size of the order and the age variable take the composition of the communities into account. For 
instance, we can assume that in smaller communities fewer and different problems occur, just as in the case of 
communities with a different age structure among members.  
 Economic and contemplative orientation of a religious community. Economic orientation is illustrated 
with the items “Owner enterprises as the most important source of funding: Yes / No” and “The name of our 
community is a brand name as well.” Contemplative orientation is illustrated with the items “How distinct is the 
contemplative orientation of your local community?” and “Work is a spiritual experience”. The items are 
measured on 5-point Likert scales. 
 13
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
4.2.3 Analyses 
We use a comparison of means to investigate hypothesis 1. For all remaining hypotheses (H2a-H4b) we use 
logistic regression analysis to investigate which variables are associated with an increased or decreased 
probability of abuse cases and rule violations. In both cases the dependent variable is binary (sexual abuse; abuse 
and internal rule violations) and consequently logistic regression is the appropriate choice. Alternatives are 
probit or tobit models. Probit models have advantages when modeling latent variables. However, in our case 
variables (abuse, rule violations) are observable. Tobit models are more appropriate for truncated variables, and 
therefore were not an option in our case. Considering these aspects jointly led us to believe that logit models are 
a good choice for our purposes. Nonetheless, we computed the Anderson Darling normality test which rejects the 
normality assumption. This again ruled out the probit regression and gave us another good reason for using 
logistic regression which is not dependent on normal distributions. For ease of interpretation the regression 
output tables display odds ratios instead of logits.    
 
5. Results 
5.1 Types of control applied in the visitation procedures 
The first part of the empirical results deals with the different types of control. Do the visitations encompass the 
different control forms specified in Managerial Control Theory (input, process-, output- and clan control)? (See 
Figure 1)  
 According to the monastic leaders, output control and ex post evaluation hold a special position in most of 
the communities. Corresponding to the theory, they are applied mainly for the control of economic performance 
where comparing budget figures with actual figures is barely a problem. Fundamental purposes, such as to 
“search for God” (Benedictines) or to “live the gospel in compassion, penance and preaching” (Franciscans) 
(Engelbert 2009; Holtz 2001) are evaluated in another way. Here, input-, process- and clan control come into 
consideration. Selection and socialization (that is, input control) are central elements of monastic governance, 
but in the context of the visitation, they play a minor part. More relevant for the monastic audit are process and 
clan controls. During interviews with monastic leaders, it became apparent that process and clan controls in the 
visitations are closely related and a separation is not possible. The main purpose of the visitations is to get an 
idea of the moral and spiritual situation of a community. First, the auditors actively participate in the religious 
life of the community during the visits. Second, and even more important, extensive one-on-one conversations 
with the religious members take place. Typical questions that address the members’ behavior refer to the 
problems and successes in monastic life and the relationships within the community. In the visitation statutes of 
the Franciscans Art. 26 (2007) it is written: “He [the visitor] should, in particular, assess how the Friars: 1. 
participate in fraternal life…; 2. cultivate the spirit of prayer and devotion; 3. behave as minors and as workers 
for justice and peace among themselves; 4. work faithfully and devotedly; 5. live a life of poverty; 6. promote 
the Franciscan charism.” In the talks, visitors try to sense if the members are meeting values and principles and, 
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where this is not the case, try to induce behavioral changes. Visitors, padres and brothers attempt to improve the 
situation with praise and criticism, with discussions in private and among the group, and with stricter measures 
where necessary. Whereas active participation and the questioning by the visitors refer mainly to processes, clan 
control takes place in the discussions and in implementing the decisions. 
 We investigate the orientation of a community in respect to the control system employed. First, linearity 
tests indicate that generally higher levels of process and clan controls are associated with higher levels of 
contemplation (F=6.26; p<0.05) and higher levels of experiencing work as a spiritual experience (F=4.17; 
p<0.05). Additionally, all deviations from linearity are not significant.  In contrast, orders that run their own 
businesses rely more strongly on output control. Running a business serves as a proxy for economic orientation. 
The t-test indicates that orders running a business attach a higher importance to output control (|t|=  2.07; p<0.05) 
than do the remaining organizations. In addition, orders using their names as brands are associated with higher 
output control (F=2.82; p<0.1). Again all deviations from linearity are not significant. 
 In the second step, we break the analysis down to the different archetypes of religious orders. The results of 
the comparison of means are displayed in Table 4. The numbers illustrate that the visitation systems differ 
according to a community’s affiliation. Monastic orders attach significantly more weight to the control of 
finance and economy than other communities do. This can be partly explained by the business activities of these 
orders. Many of them have associated enterprises (from breweries to publishers to commercial real estate) and, 
thus, financial monitoring is more imperative. Tendencies in the mendicant  (Capuchin, Dominican, Franciscans) 
and clerks regular orders (Jesuits) are difficult to interpret. For example, we find that mendicants attach 
significantly less importance to process and clan controls compared to the rest of the sample. The opposite is the 
case for clerks regular. The latter give significantly more importance to process and clan controls. However, the 
differences in priorities are obvious. The case suggests that audit procedures depend on the customs and 
traditions of an organization. Visitations reflect the control culture: output-, process-, and clan control are 
weighted differently when auditing the various communities.  
 To summarize, visitations constitute a comprehensive control tool that considers measurability of outputs 
and knowledge of the transformation process. Overall, these results support hypothesis 1 and show that 
contemplative organizations, with their hardly measurable outputs, rely more on process and clan controls in the 
audit procedure; whereas, economically orientated orders rely on output control to a stronger extent. Further, 
monastic traditions and purposes influence the concrete configuration of the audits. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.2 Effectiveness of the visitations  
Fourteen communities that completed our survey a few months before the scandals went public in 2010 have 
been severely affected by those incidents. The results of our logistic regression analyses are shown in Tables 5a 
and 5b. Table 5a displays results for the analysis of sexual abuse cases; whereas, Table 5b presents the results for 
the analysis of abuse and internal rule violations. Both tables display odds ratios for ease of interpretation. An 
odds ratio larger than 1 indicates a higher probability of abuse and rule violations; whereas, an odds ratio below 
one indicates a lower probability of such events. We estimate five different models for each dependent variable.  
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 Estimation strategy and Robustness. The first four models focus on the main variables of interest: type of 
control, frequency of visitations and supportive identity development. The final model (models 5 and 10) 
estimates the full set of variables. Presenting several models for each case serves as an additional robustness 
check. We further checked for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF). For all models 
the VIF are within normal limits. The mean VIF for the full model is 2.07 and the largest single VIF is 3.28. 
Hence, we have no reason to believe multicollinearity is a problem in our analyses. With the one exception of 
model 3, no major problem was noted according to the results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. Also, pseudo R-
square values fall into acceptable ranges. Additionally, the linktest specification check did not yield worrying 
results. Thus, we conclude that, overall, all but one model have a good fit with the data. 
 Results for sexual abuse cases. We first consider the impact on sexual abuse cases. Hypothesis 2a stipulated 
that process and clan controls are associated with lower probabilities of sexual abuse occurring. All models 
display significant odds ratios lower than one indicating that these control forms are associated with a lower 
probability of sexual abuse cases occurring. Therefore, we accept hypothesis 2a.  
 Hypothesis 3a linked the likelihood of sexual abuse cases in church organizations to the frequency of 
visitations. Model 1 does not indicate any effect in this respect. However, once we start controlling for a variety 
of factors, results become stable and significant. Results indicate that higher values, that is, lower frequency of 
visitations, are associated with a higher probability of abuse cases. Therefore, we have to accept hypothesis 3a.  
 Hypothesis 4a established that communities whose visitation procedures are supportive and contribute to the 
order’s identity development would have a lower probability of suffering from sexual abuse cases. The full 
model supports this hypothesis. The odds ratio is below 1 and significant, indicating that identity developing 
visitation procedures are associated with lower probabilities of sexual abuse cases in religious orders.  
 Because opportunity invites wrongdoing, it comes as no surprise that an engagement in child and youth 
work (item “youth”) increases the risk of sexual misconduct. This variable is positively associated with the 
probability of sexual abuse occurring and significant in all models. Overall, we find limited but nonetheless 
existing evidence for our hypotheses. However, we have to acknowledge the low significance as all coefficients 
of the main variables sit on the 10%  level. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5a [Logistic reg on abuse] about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 Results for abuse and rule violations. Now we consider results for the analysis of rule violations (models 6 
to 10). The estimation strategy is the same as in the previous section. Diagnostic checks such as the Hosmer-
Lemeshow Test did not raise any concerns and pseudo R-square values fall into acceptable ranges. Hypothesis 
2b linked such misconduct to process and clan controls. Similarly to the results for abuse cases, we find the 
results are stable across all models, highly significant and in the expected direction, that is, process and clan 
controls are associated with lower probabilities of misconduct. Thus we accept hypothesis 2b.  
 Hypothesis 3b stipulated that the frequency of visitations is associated with lower probabilities of rule 
violations. We do not find a significant result at this time, and therefore have to reject hypothesis 3b. Ultimately, 
hypothesis 4b argued that supportive, identity developing visitations are associated with a lower likelihood of 
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misconduct and rule violations. In this case, the results are clear, significant and stable across models supporting 
hypothesis 4b. Again involvement in child and youth work was significantly associated with an increased 
probability of rule violations. 
 Considering the analysis for abuse cases and rule violations jointly, the most important result is the 
validation of hypotheses 2a and 2b highlighting the importance of control mechanisms other than output control. 
The focus of control is moderately significant (OR = 0.03; p<0.1) for abuse cases and highly significant if we 
add cases of internal rule violation (OR = 0.11, p<0.01). Religious communities that attach more relative weight 
to process and clan control (the control of basic principles and spiritual life) than to output control exhibit less 
misconduct. Additionally, visitations that support the order’s identity development appear to be beneficial and 
help to discipline the order’s members. Consequently, the emphasis on identity development indicates an 
alternative way to reduce wrongdoing.  
 It is possible to draw some cautious conclusions on the effectiveness of the visitations today and to clarify 
hypotheses 2 and 3.4 The outcomes on child abuse and on rule violations suggest that process and clan controls 
make an impact on supervising principles and spiritual life. In the next subsection, we take a qualitative look at 
implementation and additional services. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5b [Logistic reg on rule violations] about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.3 The crucial role of implementation and identity development 
To enable a functioning assessment, the control type is not the only relevant factor. How the control procedures 
are implemented and perceived is essential. Such questions are not considered marginal in the survey. We take a 
brief look at this important aspect – in the conversations with the monastic leaders and in reviewing monastic 
constitutions.  
 Trust, secrecy, embeddedness.  In the conversations with the monastic leaders, we asked about special 
requirements this form of audit involves. In all religious orders, trustworthiness is named as an inevitable feature 
if the visitations are to have a full impact. Fundamental respect and mutual trust between visitor and community 
member are considered essential for fruitful cooperation. In many constitutions, we find an admonition to the 
visitors to criticize in a fraternal manner in wisdom and love (Beuroner Benediktinerkongregation 2003). The 
controlled padres and brothers must not be humiliated or put under pressure. In return, the controlled members 
have a responsibility and are encouraged to cooperate truthfully with the visitors (CIC 1983: pp. 628). Reliability 
is further emphasized with the mandatory obligation of secrecy; a comprehensive privacy protection is 
guaranteed. The visitor “is forbidden to reveal to anyone, in any way, the names of the Friars about whom he has 
learned something harmful…” (Franciscans 2007, pp. 33). This represents a substantial difference from common 
                                                 
4 A parallel historical study underscores the impressive significance of the little-known visitations in Christianity 
and supports the impression from the quantitative analysis. The existence over centuries – from late antiquity 
until today (Peters 2003), and in the religious orders for almost a millennium – of the visitations, plus their 
dissemination to all religious orders, dioceses and beyond the Catholic Church (Schwaiger 2003), point to an 
extraordinary, successful governance instrument. The history of their reception illustrates the flexibility and the 
broad applicability of this religious assessment tool, and reveals an instrument that heavily influenced the paths 
of the examined organizations. The focus on output-, process- and clan control to monitor economic health and 
spiritual life, a constituting element from the beginning, proved highly successful. 
 17
evaluation practices, which, to the contrary, emphasize transparency. Finally, the procedure is embedded in the 
spiritual life and tradition of the community. Padres and brothers pray for successful procedures and agreement, 
with services marking the beginning and ending of the visits. Such connections with personal faith underline the 
seriousness of the assessment and give some sense to the monastic audit.  
 Service orientation. In addition to the implementation, visitations are seen as a service to the community 
(Peters 2003). As apparent already in the definitions of the visitation, the control aspect is but one among others. 
According to many padres and brothers interviewed, spiritual strengthening and encouragement of the members 
is of major importance. Where legal rules about visitations are available, this objective is also explicitly 
mentioned (Salesians 1984). The Premonstratensians’ constitutions read:  “…therefore it is the first task of the 
visitation to strengthen the dynamic spiritual life, to consolidate legitimate, local customs” (Premonstratensians 
1997, pp. 227). Again, the results are confirmed in the survey. The monastic leaders were invited to name further 
objectives of the visitations that are carried out in their local communities. Different tasks are attributed to the 
monastic auditing beyond control functions. Table 6 lists these goals according to the number of times each goal 
is mentioned in the survey. The most frequently mentioned keywords are better communication, strengthening of 
community, and individual members, followed by conversation about personal mental state, discussion of future 
perspectives and renewal of the spiritual life. In their talks, visitors not only focus on monitoring and 
intervention, but try to encourage the members and offer assistance. It is striking that more than half the goals 
mentioned (printed in bold letters in Table 6) relate to strengthening and identity development. Visitations in the 
best-case scenario are a service to the community, which in turn fosters adequate behavior by deepening identity 
and faith. Therefore, spiritual discipline and the observance of canonical and monastic law should not be 
emphasized through control alone, but through an improvement of the living conditions of the religious 
members.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 Monastic auditing indicates that many visitors attach great importance to correct implementation and 
complementary services. The elimination of misconduct by means of controls is not the only intention; the 
assessment is combined with different tasks like emphasizing communication or strengthening the communal life 
(Peters 2003; Hein 2005).  
 For a successful auditing, not only the types of control are essential, but also the kind of implementation has 
to be considered. Our analysis illustrates that control works if the assessed members cooperate and accept the 
procedures. Additionally, for the interviewed monastic leaders, support in monastic life and identity 
strengthening, central targets of the visitations, have an effect on the (mis-)behavior of the members. The effect 
is also reflected in the empirical analysis (H4a and H4b). 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The search for good governance is one of the major issues in this decade. How are managers and employees 
controlled to reduce misconduct and unethical behavior? In addition to stricter regulation, financial incentives 
based on output control are the favored instrument in steering working employee behavior. The success of output 
control procedures continues in the corporate sector (Hilb 2011) and encroaches into other fields such as public 
administration or education (Frey et al. 2013, Wragg et al. 2004). However, it is highly controversial as to 
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whether this one-sided direction on tightened regulation and an enhancement of external controls alone lead to 
satisfactory outcomes. With their visitation systems, religious orders offer some alternative concepts worthy of 
consideration by other organizational forms. The analysis of multiple orientations of control (subsection 5.1) and 
their effectiveness (subsection 5.2) in religious orders leads us to the conclusions outlined below.  
 First, only a control system that is characterized by multiple orientations meets the requirements of good 
governance. The religious orders devote themselves to many different tasks, and the control systems need to take 
this into account. Spiritual services such as prayer and meditation are part of their mission. Similarly, social 
work, cultural tasks and the production of goods such as books or beer are interwoven with the mission of 
religious orders. As a consequence, none of the examined communities can be reduced to one, two or even three 
of these tasks. In such conditions, exclusively output-oriented control systems are not viable. Following Ouchi 
(1977, 1979) and his colleagues, the control must fit the task environment of the goods and services. As they 
differ highly in nature, it is not sufficient to refer to one of the control archetypes (clan-, process- or output 
control). Instead, we need systems that offer a manifold orientation of control. This is confirmed in the analysis. 
Communities that neglected the control of spirituality and community life (that is, process and clan controls) in 
their visitation procedures and focused instead on the business routine of their organizations, show a higher 
probability of abuse cases and rule violations. 
 As with the religious communities, most other organizations, including small ones, provide a wide range of 
tasks and objectives. We expect similar control patterns. Across private firms, nonprofit organizations and public 
administration, output control has increasingly become the dominant control type. In governance systems where 
an exclusive use of output measures is common, the behavior of the employees is channeled toward fulfilling 
tasks relevant for their assessment and compensation (Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Johnson 2011). 
Individuals act strategically to reach their goals (Bebchuk and Fried 2005, Holmström and Milgrom 1991; 
Jensen 2003; Jensen et al. 2004; Rajan 2010). Behaviors that cannot be easily monitored, such as organizational 
citizenship behavior, tend to be ignored (Weibel 2007). A multiple-oriented control system, involving input-, 
process-, or clan control, mitigates the potentially negative effects of pure output control. Wrong incentives are 
reduced, and the challenges of difficult measurability and performance accountability are faced with a more 
comprehensive basis (Frost et al. 2010). Process- and clan control shift the focus away from employees who 
want immediate gratification and are tempted to violate standards (Johnson et al. 2009). Finally and probably 
most importantly, a well-balanced control system takes into account the firm’s culture and values (Fortado 1994; 
Simons 1995; 2000) and is able to influence the behavior of management and employees. Behavior consistent 
with group expectations, norms and values will be rewarded; fraudulent behavior will be sanctioned (Fortado 
1994; Osterloh and Frey 2006). It has been shown that belief and value systems can be powerful levers of control 
(Rodrigue et al. 2013; Simons 2000). Organizations, in particular nonprofit ones, may benefit from an increased 
use of such control systems. 
 Second, the specific characteristic of monastic visitations is the distinct coexistence of different types of 
control in the monastic audits. Performance is hard to measure in the religious institutions, so alternative types of 
control that do not rely on outputs have been developed. What is surprising here is that different types of control 
are applied simultaneously in the auditing process. This is commonly an area of governance normally focused 
strongly on processes, output control and ex post evaluations (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012). The visitations 
not only help to control the books and the economic situation, but if correctly applied, they also consider 
organization culture, that is, the spirit and the discipline of the monks, and the adherence to principles and 
 19
traditions. Formal and informal control mechanisms are considered (Cardinal et al. 2010). Whereas output 
control plays a role in the monitoring of economic activities and the financial state of a community, the control of 
values and principles through process and clan controls is equally important. Our analysis substantiates the 
success of the twofold orientation of monastic audits, an emphasis differing considerably from auditing processes 
in other organizations. This extension of auditing and monitoring procedures could be a promising way to 
achieve better governance in other control systems as well. 
 Third, the study demonstrates that not only are the different types of control important but identity 
development is crucial (subsection 5.3). In the twentieth century, the focus in the religious orders’ auditing 
tended to shift away from a one-sided orientation on control to favoring a system of support and mutual 
assistance. Individual support and identity development go hand in hand with visitation procedures. A 
strengthening of community and individual members is expected to foster a correct attitude and behavior in the 
padres, sisters and brothers, as in the case of controls. Additionally, with great care, the religious communities 
embed the visitation processes in their daily life and the value system of their organizations to provide sense and 
comprehension. Such an approach bringing together control and support may seem idealistic for some 
organizations; however, it could be worthwhile to configure controls in such a way as to prevent feelings of 
distrust or marginality. The findings in the religious orders illustrate that controls do not have to be perceived as 
being controlling to have effect. Intrinsic values, such as identification, trust, and integrity, promote a 
functioning control system (De Charms 1968; Deci and Ryan 1980; Frey 1997; Osterloh and Weibel 2008).  
 Fourth, we adopt a more general perspective that points beyond internal audit measures by examining the 
abuse scandals. The investigation shows that even organizations whose raison d’être is compassion are not 
immune to severe governance failures. It also appears that the instrument of the visitations was not sufficient to 
guarantee correct behavior. Knowing that the following considerations need some verification, the cases indicate 
that the coordination with other control mechanisms was not adequately developed. Instead of dealing with the 
scandals and accounting for the past behaviors, the sexual abuse cases were placed under a taboo. This behavior 
reveals one of the most severe dangers of internal governance, the emergence of groupthink (Janis 1972; Taifel 
1981). Monastic communities are life partnerships that depend on a distinct homogeneity among members 
(Schmelzer 1979). Strong group cohesion is fostered with internal control mechanisms – for instance, with a 
rigorous socialization of the novices – and the development of a strong corporate identity. Groupthink can be one 
consequence leading to the wrong kind of solidarity between members or into a culture of concealment. 
Additionally, because of a specific Catholic trait of keeping up the reputation of the “Holy Church” at all costs, 
high dignitaries ignored abuses and inadvertently sanctioned wrong behavior. Closely connected as well is the 
dichotomy of church law and state law – a further obstacle to transparency (Kaufmann, 2010). The negative 
aspects of groupthink can be addressed by various measures. In addition to internal strategies, for instance, 
implementing a culture of critical examination, an outside perspective can improve matters (Janis 1972). The 
visitations could have been the element to bring in the urgently required diversity. If seriously applied and 
executed, a positive preventive effect may be expected. If visitors openly address such concerns, the repression 
of dealing with such taboos should be absent. However, as the analysis illustrates, the controls have not always 
been implemented consistently and, by focusing on financial issues, were no counterweight to the strong internal 
control mechanisms. The case illustrates the importance of taking a holistic view of control systems. Internal 
audits are just one part in a comprehensive organizational governance system.  
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 As a contribution to the literature on good governance and auditing, our paper focuses attention on a 
multiple orientation of control in the auditing procedures of religious orders. It becomes obvious that a “one-fits-
all” approach is not enough to face the challenges. Internal audits limited to economic valuation and compliance 
with the law are incomplete and do not fulfill today’s requirements anymore. Further, by including 
implementation practices and additional services such as identity development, we point to neglected aspects in 
the management control literature. With control instruments applied and practiced over centuries, religious 
orders offer some concepts and ideas worth considering toward better governance beyond the religious field. 
 
7. Limitations and future research 
This study has an explorative character; it is intended to stimulate further research that would be able to 
overcome the limitations of this study. First, this study is limited to the German-speaking area, as all orders who 
responded to our survey are located in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. However, since all orders worldwide 
rely on similar governance structures, our analysis offers a first glance into their advantages and problems. 
Second, the number of reported abuse cases is quite limited. Therefore, future research embracing larger samples 
of orders may be able to generate more detailed insights on the prevention of abuse cases. Related to the limited 
data available on abuse cases is another issue: Orders relying heavily on clan controls may experience less 
denunciation by abused individuals as those may still feel some obligation to the order. The latter may affect our 
dependent variable, however, is not measurable at all. The insights gained through interviews helped to mitigate 
this issue a little bit. Third, one needs to account for the particular characteristics of religious orders. Certainly 
we do not propagate a one-to-one transfer of monastic governance instruments (for a detailed discussion, see 
Inauen et al. 2010a). Circumstances vary too widely, and an implementation depends on, for instance, the form, 
purpose, size, situation or context of an organization (Alford and Hughes 2008). However, it might be rewarding 
to do research into business alternatives to approach some of the problems in governance today (Clarke 2011; 
Benz and Frey 2007). 
 Future research on multiple control systems should not only consider different types of control and explore 
their relations among each other more deeply, but should also take into account surrounding conditions as the 
impact of implementation practices. Different starting points are conceivable precisely because similar control 
instruments already exist. For instance, the internal audit in many organizations encompasses the efficiency of 
processes and compliance with law and regulations. Broadening the scope of internal audit procedures is likely 
to play an increasingly important role in the future. 
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Fig. 1 Visitations in religious orders: basic framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Sample of religious orders 
Category  Name of the 
religious order  
No. of 
surveys 
received 
Category  Name of the  
religious order  
No. of 
surveys 
received 
Monastic orders Benedictines 10 Clerks regular a Jesuits/Society of Jesus 11 
Cistercians 5 Camillians 2 
Carthusians c 1 Congregations b Redemptorists 5 
Canons regular Augustinian Canons 7 Divine Word Missionaries 8 
Premonstratensians 6 Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate 4 
Mendicant orders Dominicans 8 White Fathers 4 
Capuchins 11 Salvatorians 4 
Franciscans 17 Single communities c 2 
Carmelites c 1 Total 106 
 
Notes: The scale of the religious orders in the German-speaking area was elicited via the websites of the communities (number of 
communities). Rate of Return: Benedictines 40%, Cistercians 45%, Augustinian Canons 45%, Premonstratensians 75%, Dominicans 62%, 
Capuchins 65%, Franciscans 68%, Jesuits/Society of Jesus 69%, Redemptorists 45%, Divine Word Missionaries 62%, Missionary Oblates of 
Mary Immaculate 67%, White Fathers 57%, Salvatorians 57%. A nonresponse bias on the level of religious orders does not appear. 
a The Jesuits have, by far, the largest size and impact in this category. Besides the Society of Jesus, only a few very small communities exist 
in the German-speaking area. We have chosen the Camillians as a second organization. 
b In the category of Congregations, with several dozen religious orders, the proportions are not obvious. 
c Some single communities exemplary of a certain category of religious order are included as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
A
b
il
it
y 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 o
u
tp
u
ts
  
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
Perfect                 Imperfect 
 
Process control 
 
 
Clan control or 
input control 
 
 
Process control 
or output 
control 
 
 
Output control 
Reduced misbehavior / 
misconduct 
No crowding out of motivation 
Reinforcing faith and identity 
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Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. 
  
Occurrence of sexual abuse 
case  
Dummy variable equal to 1 
if cases of sexual abuse 
were reported in reference 
to one of the orders in the 
sample 
0.14 0.34 
Occurrence of internal rule 
violation 
Dummy variable equal to 1 
if rule violation was 
reported on the survey 
0.25 0.44 
   
N  96  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
        
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. 
    
Focus on process and clan 
control 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if focus is 
on process and clan control (1), or 0 if 
focus is on Output control  
0.51 0.50 
Frequency Frequency of visitation as number of 
visitations per year 
3.27 1.43 
Supportive Dummy variable equal to 1 if visitation 
is perceived as supporting, 0 otherwise 
0.29 0.46 
Canons regular Dummy variable equal to 1 if  order is  
“canons regular” 
0.10 0.31 
Monastic Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
“monastic order” 
0.13 0.33 
Mendicant Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
“mendicant order” 
0.39 0.49 
Congregation Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
“congregation” 
0.24 0.43 
Youth Dummy variable equal to 1 if members 
of the order are active in youth or child 
development, 0 otherwise 
0.41 0.49 
Germany Dummy variable equal to 1 if order is 
located in Germany 
0.48 0.50 
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Austria Dummy variable equal to 1 if order is 
located in Austria 
0.26 0.44 
Size Number of members 18.76 21.03 
   
Age Mean age of community members 60.27 9.09 
    
 N   96   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Types of control: comparison of means 
 
Factors that influence the visitations types of control: economic orientation, contemplative orientation 
 
  
Process and clan control  
 
 
Output control  
 
 
Religious Order 
 
N  |T| Sig. N  |T| Sig. 
Canons regular  10  0.298 0.766 10  0.234 0.815 
Monastic Orders 12  0.921 0.359 12  2.739 0.007*** 
Mendicants 37  2.20 0.029* 37  1.179 0.241 
Congregations 23  0.248 0.804 23  0.651 0.516 
Clerks regular 13  1.941 0.054† 13  0.734 0.46 
 
N total 
 
95 
  
 
95 
 
 
Notes: ***p <  .001.  **p < .01.  *p < .05. †p < .10.  
 
Comparison of means. Each order is tested against the remainder of the sample. 
 
To describe the different foci of the religious orders, we outline the deviation from the mean of all religious 
orders in the sample. Example: For the 12 monastic orders in the sample, output control is significantly more 
important (t=2.7, p<.01) than for the average community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
Table 5a. Logistic Regression on Sexual abuse cases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable abuse abuse abuse abuse abuse 
Independent Variables odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio 
      
Focus on process and clan control 0.155** 0.0799**   0.0316* 
(0.126) (0.101)   (0.0594) 
Frequency 1.153  2.654*  3.443* 
 (0.276)  (1.531)  (2.541) 
Identity development 0.433   0.255 0.106* 
 (0.359)   (0.302) (0.142) 
Canons regular  0.166 0.00975 0.78 0.000559* 
  (0.299) (0.0286) (1.153) (0.00226) 
Monastic  1.406 0.398 10.42 0.00839 
  (2.732) (0.94) (16.92) (0.0311) 
Mendicant  0.0387** 0.0130** 0.139* 0.00120** 
  (0.0551) (0.024) (0.164) (0.00362) 
Congregations  0.0182** 0.0109** 0.0558** 0.00108** 
  (0.0294) (0.0194) (0.0752) (0.00289) 
Youth  4.626* 8.837** 4.900* 7.638* 
  (4.049) (8.91) (4.153) (8.164) 
Germany  40.84* 142.1** 104.7** 65.07* 
  (83.96) (320) (216.1) (156.1) 
Austria  9.382 20.65 12.59 20.32 
  (16.28) (38.34) (21.15) (40.87) 
Size  1.022 1.023 1.018 1.024 
  (0.0266) (0.0278) (0.0247) (0.0272) 
Age  1.07 1.087 1.057 1.074 
  (0.0599) (0.0647) (0.0587) (0.0695) 
Constant 0.217 0.000522 1.89e-06** 0.000106** 0.000115 
 (0.208) (0.0024) (0.0000101) (0.000482) (0.000656) 
      
N 96 96 96 96 96 
 
McFadden R2 0.129 0.474 0.437 0.416 0.556 
            
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5b. Logistic Regression on Internal Rule Violations 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable rule violation rule violation rule violation rule violation rule violation 
Independent Variables (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) 
      
Focus on process and clan control 0.234*** 0.167**   0.116*** 
(0.13) (0.118)   (0.0928) 
Frequency 1.072  1.158  1.147 
 (0.207)  (0.418)  (0.583) 
Identity development 0.160**   0.0836** 0.0532** 
 (0.128)   (0.0881) (0.0609) 
Canons regular  0.607 0.735 1.129 0.298 
  (0.713) (1.223) (1.282) (0.68) 
Monastic  1.777 3.332 6.106 1.088 
  (2.315) (5.521) (7.854) (2.629) 
Mendicant  0.161* 0.241 0.35 0.0999 
  (0.152) (0.252) (0.326) (0.149) 
Congregations  0.273 0.411 0.417 0.149 
  (0.266) (0.408) (0.395) (0.198) 
Youth  3.281* 3.377** 3.671** 4.174* 
  (2.1) (2.039) (2.397) (3.097) 
Germany  11.04** 16.34** 23.74** 20.15** 
  (13.43) (18.89) (30.26) (28.77) 
Austria  21.12** 21.54*** 30.28*** 37.41** 
  (25.99) (24.92) (38.94) (53.55) 
Size  1.025 1.02 1.018 1.022 
  (0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0165) 
Age  1.066 1.066 1.056 1.075 
  (0.0457) (0.0435) (0.0452) (0.0547) 
Constant 0.695 0.00130** 0.000231*** 0.000583** 0.000877* 
 (0.536) (0.00421) (0.000734) (0.00188) (0.00339) 
      
N 96 96 96 96 96 
 
McFadden R2 0.152 0.347 0.279 0.357 0.445 
            
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Tasks of the visitations 
Which further tasks are accomplished with the visitations?   
                              
Number of mentions 
 
- Foster communication, encourage meetings 10 
- Strengthening the community 6 
- Individual encouragement/strengthening 5 
- Conversation about personal mental state 5 
- Future perspectives, goals  5 
- Renewal of mission/spiritual life 4 
- Preparatory talks about mutations  3 
- To open a debate 2 
- Single indications: preparation of gatherings, supervision in situations of change,   
  exchange of experience between communities, shelter from work overload, etc.  
1 
 
Notes: Data in bold letters refer to identity development 
 
 
 
Appendix A. Correlations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
1 Control types  
2 Focus on process & clan control -0.30 *  
3 Sexual abuse -0.01 -0.28 *  
4 Abuse - rule violations 0.03 -0.30 * 0.69 *  
5 Frequency -0.09 -0.22 * 0.12 0.10  
6 Identity development -0.01 0.08 -0.12 -0.26 * -0.03  
7 Canons regular -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.49 * -0.07  
8 Monastic orders -0.09 -0.20 0.31 * 0.29 * 0.37 * -0.03 -0.13  
9 Mendicant orders 0.22 * -0.08 -0.19 -0.26 * -0.06 0.10 -0.27 *  
10 Congregations 0.03 0.06 -0.15 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09 -0.19  
11 Child and youth work 0.00 -0.08 0.29 * 0.26 * -0.03 0.03 0.00  
12 Germany 0.09 -0.06 0.17 0.07 -0.12 0.07 -0.05  
13 Austria -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.09 -0.07 0.19  
14 Number of members 0.03 -0.11 0.28 * 0.31 * 0.27 * -0.07 0.11  
15 Mean age 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.21 * -0.07 -0.31 *  
 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14   
9 Mendicant orders -0.30 *             
10 Congregations -0.21 * -0.44 *           
11 Child and youth work 0.14  -0.13  -0.02          
12 Germany -0.24 * 0.05  0.15  0.14        
13 Austria 0.13  -0.08  -0.22 * -0.10  -0.57 *     
14 Number of members 0.40 * -0.33 * 0.08  0.13  0.05  0.01    
15 Mean age -0.04  -0.02  0.28 * 0.02  -0.02  -0.34 0.10 *  
 
*p<0.05, N=96  
Means and standard deviations are displayed in tables 2a and 2b. 
 
 
